Brazil’s New Right

On Saturday, April 7, Brazil’s former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva surrendered to the police and will begin serving a twelve-year sentence for corruption. His imprisonment throws the Brazilian left into crisis. With the popular Lula out of the race, the Workers’ Party is left with no presidential candidate to run in the upcoming elections and creates an opening for a new right-wing candidate to win. The article below, written before these developments, charts the emergence of Brazil’s new right, as well as prospects for the left in this October’s elections and beyond. ―Editors

It became clear that political conflict in Brazil had reached a new level of hyper-reality last November when right-wing demonstrators in São Paulo burned an effigy of Judith Butler outside a cultural center hosting a conference she had co-organized. They shouted “Burn the witch!” as they set fire to the scarecrow-like dummy. Three days later, another group of demonstrators surrounded Butler herself as she made her way through São Paulo airport. Protesters accused her of supporting pedophilia as she attempted to wheel her luggage cart past the airport’s mobile phone and rental-car kiosks. Brazilians have long been accustomed to seeing their political struggles caricatured in telenovelas. With the current crisis, it seems, we need not await the telenovela: the events themselves are already exaggerated manifestations of deeper conflicts.

Cultural theorists generally attract about as much attention on the streets of Brazil as they do in the United States—which is to say none. It’s unlikely that many of the protesters had even read anything by Judith Butler. But a loose-knit network of right-wing activists used her visit as an opportunity to stoke the fires of resentment, tarring her as “the mother of gender ideology.” These activists describe any questioning of traditional gender roles either itself as a manifestation of communism, or as a ploy to undermine Brazil’s education system, facilitating its takeover by communist agents. Butler was cast as the arch-villain behind this nefarious plot. As it happens, she was not in Brazil to speak about gender at all. The conference she helped organize was on a topic more immediately relevant to Brazil’s current crisis: “The Ends of Democracy.”

The attacks on Butler were directed by a new right in Brazil, one riven by contradictions but nevertheless committed to flexing its cultural and electoral muscle. Its emergence has come as a surprise to many political observers: only a few years ago, it seemed as if the Brazilian right had largely disappeared, as business elites prospered under two decades of a center-left administration, and cultural pluralism flourished. The Butler episode, along with earlier protests against a queer art exhibit in Porto Alegre and a nude performance piece in São Paulo, is the sign of an unexpectedly powerful backlash, one with profound implications for Brazil’s civil society.

Since the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, Brazil has been in a state of political irresolution. The new right threatens to seize the opportunity created by this crisis to become the decisive force in Brazil’s 2018 elections. This is a grim prospect for those committed to cultural tolerance and the democratic rule of law in the largest nation in South America.

Michel Temer, Rousseff’s former vice president, now occupies the presidency. The Rousseff-Temer ticket represented an alliance between Rousseff’s labor-friendly Worker’s Party (PT) and Temer’s centrist Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). It was an awkward alliance at the best of times, and Temer showed no remorse in joining the push to impeach Rousseff. He has since sought to cut back dramatically on social spending while placating the business sector. He has tilted more sharply to the right in recent months, including the February 2018 initiation of direct military intervention in public security in Rio de Janeiro—an executive power rarely implemented since re-democratization in 1985, and never implemented without destructive consequences for the most vulnerable citizens. Temer’s opponents suspect he is using the military intervention primarily as a ploy, hoping to buy time to build legislative support for a controversial cutback on government pensions.

The 2018 election will serve as a referendum on Temer’s policies. Over the past twenty years, Temer’s PMDB has chosen strategic alliances over retail politics and will likely not nominate a presidential candidate. Temer’s politics are most closely aligned with Geraldo Alckmin, the candidate of the Social Democracy Party (PSDB). But the tepid Alckmin, a former governor of São Paulo state, tends to live up to the disparaging nickname he earned in his first, ill-fated run at the presidency in 2006—the chayote popsicle. Lula da Silva, Rousseff’s predecessor and PT icon, would be the leading candidate on the left, if he were not currently ineligible by reason of criminal conviction. Lula’s legal troubles leave the left without a prominent national-level contender, with now only six months before the first round of voting in October. The new right, in contrast, has made clear its preference for Jair Bolsonaro, a candidate who scorns homosexuality, excoriates the PT, and vows to shrink federal government, with the exception of the Armed Forces. Bolsonaro affiliated with the Social Liberal Party, or PSL, in January 2018, but has belonged to five different parties over the past fifteen years, most of them marginal players in shifting right-wing coalitions. Party affiliation is a minor tactical element in his larger populist strategy, always subject to revision.

From the ashes of the culture wars

The title of Butler’s conference has a dark resonance. The allegations made against her recall the right-wing paranoia of Brazil’s 1960s. In 1964, a group calling itself TFP, for Tradição, Família e Propriedade (Tradition, Family and Property) successfully encouraged the Armed Forces to overthrow a reformist democratic administration, initiating two decades of military rule. The military regime justified its hold on power with the specter of a broad communist threat, one manifest in the moral decay of the public and the decline of traditional gender roles. Long-haired men and young women on birth control were taken as sure signs of subversion, requiring heavy-handed repression.

The regime was ultimately made obsolete by the proliferation of its bêtes noires. By the late 1970s, the gender trouble demonized a decade earlier had become so widespread, and so closely linked to consumer advertising, that it could no longer be confused with communism. Brazilian advertisers marketed counter-culture as effectively as did their North American counterparts, but with a Brazilian twist, celebrating tropical seduction and the loosening of inhibitions. The dictatorship eagerly stoked the growth of consumer society through heavy international borrowing and subsidizing the lifestyle of the urban middle class.

In the process, the military regime lost the cultural battle. Oil shocks, followed by hyperinflation, threw the nation into economic crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s. By that time, Brazil’s consumer society and its libidinous iconography were taken for granted. The dictatorship gradually ceded power before a rising tide of democratization and cultural modernism. Following ten years of economic stagnation, new currency policies tamed the beast of hyperinflation in 1993.

Over the next twenty years, Brazil achieved a rare combination of economic growth, declining inequality, and a flourishing of democracy. That period spanned the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Social Democratic Party (PSDB), in office from 1994–2002, and Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party, (PT, 2002–2010). Although Cardoso and Lula (as da Silva is universally known) headed opposing coalitions, there was a continuity to their sixteen years of administration: both the PSDB and the PT used alliances with big business to fund third-way reforms designed to redistribute government spending down the economic ladder. Cardoso’s PSDB stitched together a fractious coalition on the center-right. Lula’s PT had its roots in more radical union mobilization. But both parties governed from the center. Enmity between them was more personal than doctrinal.

Those sixteen years of continuity were never smooth sailing, as one political scandal after another rocked the boat. But as long as commodity prices continued to rise, export receipts flowed in quantities sufficient to pacify competing interest groups. High-tech domestic energy and communications sectors buoyed the expansion of a new and larger middle class. Brazil appeared to be on the road to prosperity with rising equity.

And the cultural war appeared to have ended. São Paulo’s annual Gay Pride Parade became one of the biggest and most celebrated in the world. An energetic black rights movement pressed Brazil to reckon with its long history of racism. The old moralist right of the early dictatorship seemed not only defeated but defunct.

There were, however, warning signs that the economic good times might be coming to an end. When, in 2013, massive crowds took to the streets of Brazil’s cities demanding improved social spending, it was not clear if it was the debut of a maturing civil society or the sign of political crisis. Rousseff, Lula’s handpicked successor, struggled to accommodate these protests while maintaining the PT’s close relationships with major government contractors. Then commodity prices crashed in 2014, revealing the fault lines in this fragile landscape: as export receipts dried up, so did the wealth of the new middle class, and political alliances disintegrated.As the economy collapsed, the old moralist right staged a revival under a new group, the Free Brazil Movement (MBL). It allied with a neoliberal sector, including both entrepreneurs and members of the imperiled middle class, intent on slashing entitlement programs. This partnership turned the anti-corruption rhetoric of the 2013 protests into a partisan bludgeon leveled at the PT. Led by a cohort of provocative twenty-somethings skilled in the ways of social media, the MBL made a splash with protests against queer art exhibitions and presentations by distinguished scholars of gender like Judith Butler. The Free Brazil Movement effectively became Tradition, Family, and Property 2.0. Like the first version, the Free Brazil Movement offered the politics of resentment to middle-class, urban Brazilians convinced that welfare policies and cultural erosion were undermining their stability. The leaders of this movement could themselves have stepped out from a telenovela. Kim Kataguiri, the most visible leader of the MBL, is a young economist who idolizes Milton Friedman and scorns welfare spending. Alexandre Frota, leader of a rival faction, is an ex-porn actor who now claims to regret his wayward past and calls for defense of traditional values. Kataguiri and Frota have battled in court over the MBL name, but perfectly represent the two prongs of Brazil’s moralist, neoliberal new right.

Both of these wings have appealed to Brazil’s booming neo-Pentecostal churches, which provided most of the foot-soldiers for the demonstration that briefly made Butler a household name in Brazil. (Such churches were founded after 1950 and tend to embrace a combination of charismatic theology and aspirational networking, such as the “prosperity theology” espoused by the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.) There are over 40 million Protestants in Brazil, most affiliated either with neo-Pentecostal churches or with neo-Pentecostal sectors of more traditional denominations, such as the Baptist Church. The increasing politicization of this population is both the greatest novelty and the most unpredictable factor in the upcoming 2018 election. Back in 1964, right-wing marchers affiliated with a conservative wing of the Catholic Church took to the streets to call for military intervention. The Church discouraged this kind of reaction after the dictatorship fell, but neo-Pentecostalists have revived it.

They are well-represented in Brazil’s Congress by a bancada evangélica, or evangelical caucus. The caucus had accumulated leverage patiently since the 1980s while largely eschewing moralist campaigns. That changed in 2016, when it played a decisive role in rallying votes for Rousseff’s ouster. In the wake of her impeachment, it has rallied behind Bolsonaro, who describes himself as “a Catholic who has frequented the Baptist Church for ten years,” and who asserts the putative Christian identity of Brazil.

Bolsonaro is a long-serving member of congress from the state of Rio de Janeiro, where he emerged in the 1980s as the leader of a revanchist segment of the state police and military personnel. Many of these officers never accepted the emphasis on human rights after the fall of the dictatorship, and Bolsonaro has catered to this sentiment. As Bolsonaro accumulated power, his social media presence grew. Clips of his public appearances, marked by a virulent mix of homophobic, sexist, reactionary rhetoric, were uniquely suited to YouTube. Among the most viewed, for example, is the clip of a 2003 encounter with PT Congresswoman Maria do Rosário, in which an aggressive Bolsonaro spits out, “I wouldn’t rape you because you don’t deserve it.” (He has repeated the tenor of that insult on subsequent occasions, despite facing legal troubles as a consequence.)

The neoliberal populism of the new right

Brazil’s new right thus brings evangelical moralists together in a marriage of convenience with neoliberal entitlement-slashers, joining forces to support the electoral ambitions of a populist provocateur. If this sounds disturbingly familiar, it should.

Brazil and the United States grow more alike by the year. But unlike Trump’s

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Can Architects End the Foreclosure Crisis?

It is commonly understood today that the suburbs, home to half of Americans and facing astronomical mortgage foreclosure rates for single-family homes, are in deep financial trouble. Saskia Sassen, professor of sociology at Columbia University, has pointed to a potential mass “expulsion of homeowners” and a “marginalization of modest people” taking place around the country. She and her associates have estimated that possibly 15,000,000 mortgages can be described as “toxic assets.” From 2006 to 2010, she notes, 14.2 million mortgages were in some stage of foreclosure action. She estimates the potential total number of people who have been affected by foreclosure to be 30 million nationwide. Some of these people, she argues, move into poorer housing and multi-family rental developments; some are simply lost track of by the U.S. Census Bureau.

Many of today’s suburbs suffer from boarded windows and depreciated landscaping, underused parking lots next to clogged turnpikes, and dangerously over-occupied single-family homes. The stereotyped urban environment of violence, poverty, illegal immigrants, vacant and vandalized homes, and racial turmoil has shifted to the outer rings of the city.

A recently closed Museum of Modern Art show, Foreclosed: Rehousing the American Dream, addressed this crisis, arguing that the American Dream must be reinvented wholesale for the twenty-first century. “Change the Dream” reads a sign at the entrance of the show, “and you change the city.” The exhibit’s program describes the story behind Foreclosed:

During summer 2011, five interdisciplinary teams of architects, urban planners, ecologists, engineers, and landscape designers worked in public workshops at MoMA PS1 to envision new housing and transportation infrastructures that could catalyze urban transformation, particularly in the country’s suburbs. Responding to The Buell Hypothesis, a research report prepared by the Buell Center at Columbia University, teams—lead [sic] by MOS, Visible Weather, Studio Gang, WORKac, and Zago Architecture—focused on a specific location within one of five “megaregions” across the country to come up with inventive solutions for the future of American suburbs. This installation presents the proposals developed during the architects-in-residence program, including a wide array of models, renderings, animations, and analytical materials.

The proposed projects blur the traditional lines that separate public space from private space, owning from sharing, residential structures from business structures, and suburbs from cities. They challenge entrenched suburban rules: the segregation of residential, commercial, and industrial facilities; prohibitions on expanding and reusing buildings for new homes and businesses; tight restrictions on mixed-use properties; and traditional definitions of family.

The automobile comes in for strong criticism in the proposals, especially in the plan for the Oranges in New Jersey, which calls for eliminating many traditional streets near a rail station and replacing them “with three-story structures with a mixture of commercial, office, and residential spaces, including a variety of live-work spaces.” In this sense, Foreclosed runs parallel to the proclaimed goals of Paul and Percival Goodman in the introduction to their 1947 book Communitas: “We will criticize not only the foolish shape and power of cars but cars themselves, and not merely the cars but the factories where they are made, the highways on which they run, and the plan of livelihood that makes them necessary.”

The exhibition also introduces a new housing type: the “multi-generational and multi-household house,” which can accommodate so-called “boomerang children.” These “homes within a home” have separate entrances but are connected inside. They would be allowed in areas restricted to single-family homes, requiring zoning changes in areas that limit the number of bedrooms and baths.

All five teams pushed for a mix of residential and business development, or “mixed-use.” Often found in urban centers, “mixed-use” is gaining acceptance in the suburbs. Indeed, the projects challenge the idea that “suburbs” and “cities” are fundamentally different creatures. All advocate for variability in types and terms of ownership, including democratic housing, commonly known as “limited equity cooperatives,” rental options, and shared spaces for “live-work” (popularized by the international loft movement) and play readily available.

Foreclosed‘s radical urbanism is made possible by a system of portable mortgages, where ownership is not tied to a particular space. The team leaders describe it as “a kind of micro-governmental cooperative structure, where the local residents participate directly in determining the qualities of their neighborhood.” They aspire to start a discussion about “how to change not only the physical architecture, but the financial architecture of how things get built,” said Barry Bergdoll, exhibition curator. Taken together, the projects would seem to suggest that the American suburbs should look a lot more like the Low Countries in Europe: denser, less dependent on the car, more flexible in physical space and types of ownership, and more environmentally friendly.

The foreclosure crisis could lead to major changes in suburban development, but critics have argued that new patterns of suburban development are less likely to be brought about by a revised American Dream than by economic and demographic factors, especially given the legal barriers to the sorts of projects proposed by Foreclosed. It would be very difficult to change zoning laws to permit denser development patterns, especially in the “inner-ring” suburbs. New housing types are prohibited under many existing zoning codes. Furthermore, we should recall the Goodmans’ cautionary note in Communitas regarding zoning laws and town planning:

But apart from business interests and vested rights, common people are rightly very conservative about changes in the land, for they are very powerfully affected by such changes in very many habits and sentiments. Any community plan involves a formidable choice and fixing of living standards and attitudes, of schedule, of personal and cultural tone. Generally people move in the existing plan unconsciously as if it were nature (and will continue to do so, until suddenly the automobiles don’t move at all).

Can architects using design, advanced computer tools, and philosophy help reverse decades of community disinvestment and the financial industry’s assault? Obviously, they can’t solve the foreclosure problem per se—that’s the responsibility of the banking system, regulators, and government. And the exhibition itself has been criticized as “condescending visions imposed on the suburbs by urban-dwelling architectural elites.” It does not emphasize community involvement in the planning and design process, and the town fathers of the Oranges rejected the team’s proposal outright.

The suburbanites will defend their suburban way of life. The massive changes necessary to undo the foreclosure crisis, both physically and economically, may be beyond the reach of this generation. Communitas suggests a valuable path out of this cul-de-sac:

The best defense against planning—and people do need a defense against planners—is to become informed about the plan that is indeed existent and operating in our lives, and to learn to take the initiative in proposing and supporting reasoned changes. Such action is not only a defense but good in itself, for to make positive decisions for one’s community, rather than being regimented by other’s decisions, is one of the noble acts of man.

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